Theorie en toepassingen van de economische politiek / D.J. Wolfson. by Mierlo, Hans van
D.J. Wolfson, 
Theorie en Toepassingen van de Economische Politiek, 
Uitgeverij Coutinho, Bussum 2001, ISBN 90 6283 234 2, pp. 255. 
 
Review for De Economist 
Hans van Mierlo, Universiteit Maastricht 
First Draft: July 2002 
 
Prof Dr J.G.A. van Mierlo 
Professor of Public Finance 
E-mail: h.vanmierlo@algec.unimaaas.nl 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration  
University of Maastricht 
P.O. Box 616 
6200 MD Maastricht 
The Netherlands 
Tel ++31 43 3883641/3636 
Fax ++31 43 3884878 
 
 
Extended version, published in 
De Economist, Netherlands Economic Review, Volume 151, No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 160-163. 
 
D.J. (Dik) Wolfson retired in 1998 as a professor of economics at Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, but has held many years of his academic life the chair of professor of public finance 
at the same university. In between he was Rector of the prestigious Institute of Social Studies in 
The Hague, as well as esteemed member of WRR and the SER. As emeritus, he is a member of 
the Dutch First Chamber. Wolfson started his career as a professional economist at the World 
Bank in Washington. On basis of his professional experience as a specialist in development 
economics, he wrote his Ph.D. on “Public Finance and Development Strategy” (officially 
published some years later, in 1979). He returned to the Netherlands to work as a top civil 
servant at the Dutch Ministry of Finance, where he was the main author of the famous “Interim-
Nota Inkomensbeleid” (‘Mid Term-Report on Income Policy’) of the centre-left cabinet Den Uyl, 
published in 1975. This was the first government report ever, in which Jan Tinbergen’s ideas of 
using market forces to diminish inequalities in wealth and income, have been translated into 
concrete income policy measures. However, a final government report on ‘Income Policy’ never 
was published.  Wolfson moved then in 1975 to Rotterdam to become full professor of public 
finance. In this position he was the successor of Willem Drees junior (1963-1971) and Lenze 
Koopmans (1971-1975).  
  In addition to his Ph.D.-thesis he has written “Publieke Sector en Economische Orde” 
(1988, in Dutch), which has been used widely in the Netherlands as handbook in public sector 
economics, combining in depth-welfare economics with applications to the Dutch case, in 
particular problems of the Dutch welfare state of the nineteen eighties (the era of the ‘Dutch 
disease’!). His new book “Theorie en Toepassingen van de Economische Politiek” might be 
considered a prelude to his magnum opus. The book opens with the claim that economic policy 
has changed fundamentally with the coming of the European Union. National sovereignty of 
member states is increasingly transferred to the supranational level and the ongoing integration 
process urges for continuous reflection on and adaptation of the objectives of economic policy. 
 
  1With the entry of the Euro and the ECB, there is in Dutch economic policy (as in all smaller 
national economies in the EU!) no more space for autonomous macro-economic expenditure 
policy. Consequently, Dutch government focuses more and more on the improvement of the 
economic structure, in order to make better use of the opportunities offered by an economically 
and politically integrating Europe. Main question of the book is, how the economic way of 
thinking can contribute to the political debate on the future of Dutch society. 
  The theoretical foundations of economic policy are treated in the first part of the book. In 
part two this theory is applied to three important and controversial policy fields: big infra-
structural projects, the interrelated problems of housing, mobility and space, and the relation 
between labour, education and social security. Dik Wolfson describes how the remaining 
discretionary power in the Netherlands can be used, and how democratic solutions can play a 
role in the necessary institutional reforms. In the theoretical part Wolfson shows time and again 
that he is a student of Pieter Hennipman, the well-known Dutch professor of welfare economics 
in Amsterdam, who made in his Ph.D. in 1946 the distinction between ‘economic motive’ and 
‘economic principle’. There are no economic objectives; there are only economic means, i.e. 
scarce resources that can be employed in alternative directions to satisfy endless human needs 
(confer the well-known definition of economic science of Lionel Robbins). In economic policy, 
objectives have to be distinguished from instruments. Policy objectives are demand driven and 
are determined by the democratic political process. Policy instruments have to be evaluated 
against their contribution to the fulfilment of policy objectives, as formulated in the Social 
Welfare Function. Then the famous concepts of ‘allocative efficiency’ and ‘distributive justice’ 
are coming in as evaluation criteria, the latter being just as economical as the first. To these,   
‘sustainability’ may be added nowadays. The economist in his role of policy advisor can apply 
these evaluation criteria to analyse the efficiency and effectiveness of economic policy 
programmes.  
  This theoretical part is based on both the new institutional economics and welfare 
economics. The foundation for the analysis is provided by the ‘economic theory of collective 
goods’, as nicely summarised in the matrix of figure 2.1 on page 53. In this matrix, the well-
known (non-)excludability dimension is present, but the (non-)rivalness dimension has changed 
into adaptability of supply, varying from 0 percent, is completely indivisible, to 100 percent, is 
completely divisible. However, this refinement did not help me to understand better the various 
analytical problems of collective goods. In the lower excludability part of the matrix, a further 
distinction is made between individual goods, quasi-collective goods and club goods. This 
distinction does not refer to technical characteristics of goods but to their method of provision: 
private (markets), public (governments) or semi-public (associations). After all these years I still 
have not found what I am looking for: the final and ultimate analysis of the individual/private 
good-collective/public good taxonomy. Wolfson’s elaboration is not convincing. It is too 
complicated and actually tries to combine two approaches, which in my opinion should be kept 
strictly separated: technical characteristics that are innate, and institutional arrangements of 
provision that are decided upon politically. Both must be distinguished properly and carefully, in 
particular where students still mix them up. When students do, they always end up with the 
methodological fallacy that (pure) collective goods have to be provided by governments, just and 
only because of their technical characteristics of collective goods, quod non! 
  Another innovation claimed by Wolfson is that in his new approach to economic policy 
formation the information problem is the heart of the matter, more in particular asymmetric 
information between the various players in the economic policy field: citizens as voters, 
politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups, and most important citizens as policy consumers. This 
claim is realised in chapter four on Optimal Administration (‘Optimaal bestuur’), which presents 
 
  2a thorough analysis of how information problems pervade collective decision-making. The 
author formulates a so-called ‘layer-model’ of policy making and policy implementation in the 
public sector. Government as principal decision maker is at the first layer; institutions (public 
and private) for policy implementation at the second layer; and citizens as principals at the third 
layer. Such a layer-model results in a system of checks and balances with a clear and transparent 
division of tasks, incentives and responsibilities. In fact, we recognise here the agency-approach. 
However, in the other theoretical chapters the information approach is less prominent. 
  With regard to part 2, the applications to specific policy fields and policy problems, I can 
be short. These three chapters present a nice empirical introduction with the application of the 
theoretical framework developed in the first part of the book, but they are less convincing then 
the theoretical part itself. It seems that the author lost inspiration up at this point. The empirical 
analysis is not as thorough and the treatment of the cases somewhat superficial. Here it shows 
that Wolfson is less specialised as a field specialist and a policy analyst/evaluator, then as an 
economic theorist, methodologist and teacher. I also missed a feedback from these empirical 
chapters to the theoretical framework in part 1. What are the strong points of this theoretical 
framework for empirical analysis, and what are the weak points that need improvement? After 
all, nothing is as practical as a good theory. Now, it is up to the reader to formulate this feedback. 
Of course, thanks to the excellent first part of the book a critical reader will have no problem to 
fill in himself such feedback, but I would have preferred to read the author’s opinion about this 
as well. 
  With this book Dik Wolfson once more has proven to be an eminent economist and 
professor, who as a true literate explains very clearly to his audience complicated public sector 
problems. It is a relief to read his beautiful language and to experience that economics it is not all 
about mathematics and econometric modelling. And his magnum opus? I still wait for that to 
come, and hopefully in English, so that a worldwide audience can profit from his truly academic 
contribution to economic science. 
 
 
Short version (not published) 
 
D.J. (Dik) Wolfson, emeritus professor of public finance at Erasmus University Rotterdam, is 
well-known from his “Publieke Sector en Economische Orde” (1988, in Dutch), which has been 
used widely in the Netherlands as handbook in public sector economics, combining in depth-
welfare economics with applications to the Dutch case, in particular problems of the Dutch 
welfare state of the nineteen eighties (the era of the ‘Dutch disease’!). His new book “Theorie en 
Toepassingen van de Economische Politiek”  (again in Dutch) might be considered a prelude to 
his magnum opus. The book opens with the claim that economic policy has changed 
fundamentally with the coming of the European Union. National sovereignty of member states is 
increasingly transferred to the supranational level and the ongoing integration process urges for 
continuous reflection on and adaptation of the objectives of economic policy. With the entry of 
the Euro and the ECB, there is in Dutch economic policy (as in all smaller national economies in 
the EU!) no more space for autonomous macro-economic expenditure policy. Consequently, 
Dutch government focuses more and more on the improvement of the economic structure, in 
order to make better use of the opportunities offered by an economically and politically 
integrating Europe. Main question of the book is, how the economic way of thinking can 
contribute to the political debate on the future of Dutch society. 
  The theoretical foundations of economic policy are treated in the first part of the book. In 
part two this theory is applied to three important and controversial policy fields: big infra-
 
  3structural projects, the interrelated problems of housing, mobility and space, and the relation 
between labour, education and social security. Dik Wolfson describes how the remaining 
discretionary power in the Netherlands can be used, and how democratic solutions can play a 
role in the necessary institutional reforms. In the theoretical part Wolfson shows time and again 
that he is a student of Pieter Hennipman, the well-known Dutch professor of welfare economics 
in Amsterdam, who made in his Ph.D. in 1946 the distinction between ‘economic motive’ and 
‘economic principle’. There are no economic objectives; there are only economic means, i.e. 
scarce resources that can be employed in alternative directions to satisfy endless human needs 
(confer the well-known definition of economic science of Lionel Robbins). In economic policy, 
objectives have to be distinguished from instruments. Policy objectives are demand driven and 
are determined by the democratic political process. Policy instruments have to be evaluated 
against their contribution to the fulfilment of policy objectives, as formulated in the Social 
Welfare Function. Then the famous concepts of ‘allocative efficiency’ and ‘distributive justice’ 
are coming in as evaluation criteria, the latter being just as economical as the first. To these,   
‘sustainability’ may be added nowadays. The economist in his role of policy advisor can apply 
these evaluation criteria to analyse the efficiency and effectiveness of economic policy 
programmes.  
  This theoretical part is based on both the new institutional economics and welfare 
economics. The foundation for the analysis is provided by the ‘economic theory of collective 
goods’, as nicely summarised in the matrix of figure 2.1 on page 53. In this matrix, the well-
known (non-)excludability dimension is present, but the (non-)rivalness dimension has changed 
into adaptability of supply, varying from 0 percent, is completely indivisible, to 100 percent, is 
completely divisible. However, this refinement did not help me to understand better the various 
analytical problems of collective goods. In the lower excludability part of the matrix, a further 
distinction is made between individual goods, quasi-collective goods and club goods. This 
distinction does not refer to technical characteristics of goods but to their method of provision: 
private (markets), public (governments) or semi-public (associations). After all these years I still 
have not found what I am looking for: the final and ultimate analysis of the individual/private 
good-collective/public good taxonomy. Wolfson’s elaboration is not convincing. It is too 
complicated and actually tries to combine two approaches, which in my opinion should be kept 
strictly separated: technical characteristics that are innate, and institutional arrangements of 
provision that are decided upon politically. Both must be distinguished properly and carefully, in 
particular where students still mix them up. When students do, they always end up with the 
methodological fallacy that (pure) collective goods have to be provided by governments, just and 
only because of their technical characteristics of collective goods, quod non! 
  Another innovation claimed by Wolfson is that in his new approach to economic policy 
formation the information problem is the heart of the matter, more in particular asymmetric 
information between the various players in the economic policy field: citizens as voters, 
politicians, bureaucrats, interest groups, and most important citizens as policy consumers. This 
claim is realised in chapter four on Optimal Administration (‘Optimaal bestuur’), which presents 
a thorough analysis of how information problems pervade collective decision-making. The 
author formulates a so-called ‘layer-model’ of policy making and policy implementation in the 
public sector. Government as principal decision maker is at the first layer; institutions (public 
and private) for policy implementation at the second layer; and citizens as principals at the third 
layer. Such a layer-model results in a system of checks and balances with a clear and transparent 
division of tasks, incentives and responsibilities. In fact, we recognise here the agency-approach. 
However, in the other theoretical chapters the information approach is less prominent. 
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  With regard to part 2, the applications to specific policy fields and policy problems, I can 
be short. These three chapters present a nice empirical introduction with the application of the 
theoretical framework developed in the first part of the book, but they are less convincing then 
the theoretical part itself. It seems that the author lost inspiration up at this point. The empirical 
analysis is not as thorough and the treatment of the cases somewhat superficial.. I also missed a 
feedback from these empirical chapters to the theoretical framework in part 1. What are the 
strong points of this theoretical framework for empirical analysis, and what are the weak points 
that need improvement? After all, nothing is as practical as a good theory. Now, it is up to the 
reader to formulate this feedback. Of course, thanks to the excellent first part of the book a 
critical reader will have no problem to fill in himself such feedback, but I would have preferred 
to read the author’s opinion about this as well. 
  With this book Dik Wolfson once more has proven to be an eminent economist and 
professor, who as a true literate explains very clearly to his audience complicated public sector 
problems. It is a relief to read his beautiful language and to experience that economics it is not all 
about mathematics and econometric modelling. And his magnum opus? I still wait for that to 
come, and hopefully in English, so that a worldwide audience can profit from his truly academic 
contribution to economic science. 